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Abstract
Social mobility is an issue of growing interest in an increasingly unequal China. This study
provides new estimates of intergenerational earnings mobility in China from 1991 to 2015
using the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). In addition, this study theoretically
and empirically examines the intergenerational effects of shocks to educational attainment
from historical events like the Great Chinese Famine. There are two main findings. First,
prior estimates using the CHNS are downward biased because of measurement error. I find
that mobility in China is lower than previously thought with IGE and rank slope estimates
of approximately 0.5-0.6 for fathers and sons. Second, I find that schooling shocks in one
generation exert significant direct and intergenerational effects with respect to education
and earnings. Both findings indicate that, despite growth from economic reforms, individual
outcomes are still highly dependent on one’s parental background.
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1 Introduction
Nearly four decades of rapid economic growth has produced immense changes in Chinese
society. While economic reforms have dramatically improved living standards, the gains
from growth have not been shared equally. Indeed, the trend of increasing income inequal-
ity in China is well-documented (e.g., Xie and Zhou, 2014). Less attention, however, has
been paid to economic mobility. As an indicator of equality of opportunity, intergenera-
tional mobility tells us something about the extent to which individuals are able to move
up and down the economic ladder, relative to their parents’ background. At the same time,
apart from its importance as a measure of fairness, intergenerational mobility has a num-
ber of significant economic and political consequences. For example, mobility may impact
economic growth (Owen and Weil, 1998) and perceptions of mobility affect preferences for
redistribution (Alesina et al., 2018). These consequences may be especially important in
China, where the legitimacy of the Communist Party relies, in part, on the extent to which
it fosters equitable growth.
This study examines intergenerational mobility in two ways. The first part of this
paper provides new estimates of overall intergenerational earnings mobility in China. I use
the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), which contains earnings data for parents
and children, to examine mobility from 1991 to 2015. This analysis makes a number of con-
tributions to the growing literature on mobility in China. First, I use a novel construction
of individual labor earnings that allocates household earnings according to an individual’s
estimated productivity level. I show that previous estimates that individualize household
earnings based simply on labor hours are downward biased due to measurement error. Sec-
ond, this is the first study to use percentile ranks to estimate intergenerational mobility in
China. Ranking individuals conditional on the survey wave and an individual’s age helps
overcome the challenge posed by overall earnings growth in a rapidly growing economy. This
is also the most up-to-date study on Chinese intergenerational mobility and the first to
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estimate mobility under the Xi Jinping administration.
I find that mobility in China is low with IGE and rank slope estimates of around
0.5-0.6 for fathers and sons. The preferred specification that uses percentile ranks yields an
estimate of 0.568. The canonical model using log average earnings results in an IGE of 0.602.
Comparable studies that use the CHNS to estimate income mobility attain estimates that
are at most 0.5 (Yuan, 2017). Given that income may be more persistent across generations
than earnings (Solon, 1992; Corak and Heisz, 1999), this study estimates significantly lower
mobility compared to prior studies. Furthermore, Chinese mobility is low from an interna-
tional perspective. Despite the complexity of cross-country comparisons (Solon, 2002), the
findings of this paper suggest that China ranks among some of the most unequal countries
in terms of intergenerational mobility.
The second part of this study examines shocks to educational attainment from histor-
ical events like the Great Chinese Famine and Cultural Revolution. To define these shocks,
I use the 1990 Chinese census to estimate the extent to which an individual under- or over-
performed in educational attainment with respect to their respective birth cohort, gender,
province, and rural/urban area. Few studies have examined the intergenerational effects of
these shocks on children’s outcomes, and this is the first to study the heterogeneity of these
effects for fathers who received shocks of varying magnitudes.
I find that shocks are related to educational attainment and earnings in two gener-
ations. Positive shocks to a given group (birth cohort, gender, and province area) increase
schooling for the individuals directly affected, as well as schooling for their sons. In ru-
ral areas, sons’ earnings exhibit a U-shape with respect to the shock. This is explained by
differential mortality rates from famine and divergent preferences among positively and nega-
tively shocked fathers. In urban areas, shocks are actually linked to lower earnings for fathers
and sons. This reflects poor urban school quality, as well as effects from the “send-down”
movement during the Cultural Revolution, where millions of urban youth experienced forced
rustication. A theoretical model of intergenerational mobility that incorporates schooling
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shocks accompanies the empirical results.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on general approaches
to intergenerational mobility, as well as studies on Chinese mobility. Section 3 describes the
CHNS. Section 4 presents the empirical models and how they address econometric challenges
in estimating mobility. Section 5 describes the results for overall mobility. Section 6 examines




There exists a voluminous literature on intergenerational mobility of income and earnings.1
The general framework for estimating mobility is the following canonical model that origi-
nates in Becker and Tomes (1979):
ycit = α + ρy
p
i + εit. (1)
ycit represents the log income of child i in year t, and y
p
i is the parents’ permanent or lifetime
earnings. The coefficient β is the intergenerational elasticity of income, or IGE.
Of course, in practice, ypi is not observed, so researchers use proxy measures to ap-
proximate long-run income. However, it is well-known that estimates of the IGE are quite
sensitive to the choice and measurement of proxy variables. The literature on US mobility
is instructive.
The first studies analyzing intergenerational mobility in the US estimate an elasticity
on the order of around 0.2. However, exposure to transitory income shocks and unrepresen-
tative cross-sectional datasets used in these early studies downward biased their estimates of
1See Black and Devereux (2011) and Solon (1999) for surveys. Extensive literatures also study the
intergenerational persistence of other variables like occupation, education, and health.
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the IGE. In seminal work, Solon (1992) and Zimmerman (1992) average fathers’ income over
a period of three to five years and employ IV strategies to estimate mobility. With better
proxies for long-run status, these studies estimate the IGE to be approximately 0.4.2
Consequently, it is now standard to average parent income over a number of years to
proxy for permanent income. In addition, IV and 2SLS strategies have been used. For exam-
ple, Solon (1992) uses father’s education and Zimmerman (1992) uses father’s socioeconomic
status as instruments for permanent status. Other instruments include father’s occupation
(Björklund and Jäntti, 1997), union status (Shea, 2000), and industry (Gong et al., 2012).
Using an IV provides a reasonable upper limit on IGE if the instrument is a direct determi-
nant of a child’s income.3 The interval between OLS and IV estimates may therefore bound
the true value of the IGE.
Mobility estimates are also biased when earnings are observed during different parts
of the life-cycle. Different methods have been employed to compensate for this “life-cycle
bias,” as well as for persistent transitory shocks to income mentioned above. Hendricks
(2007) computes the intergenerational persistence of income by simulating models of parent
and child earnings. Mazumder (2003), following Baker and Solon (2003), replicates the
results from Solon (1992) and uses an earnings model to calculate reliability ratios, or the
degree of attenuation bias in Solon’s sample. Chetty et al. (2014), using data on more than 40
million families, find that estimates are robust to attenuation bias, as well as measurements
of income over the life-cycle. This suggests that large datasets can limit the adverse effects
that transitory shocks and life-cycle bias present to estimating mobility.
While much of the literature has focused on US mobility, many studies also have
been devoted to intergenerational mobility in other developed and developing countries.
Cross-country differences in mobility may reflect, among other factors, differences in the
2Mazumder (2005) makes the case that these findings are still downward biased because of persistent
transitory shocks to income. He estimates an IGE of 0.6 using 16-year averages. However, Chetty et al.
(2014) notes this large result is likely a consequence of a large number of imputations (up to 60% of the
sample).
3However, see Mazumder (2005) for a discussion on why the IV approach may be consistent or even
downward-biased.
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heritability of traits, returns to human capital, and progressivity in human capital investment
(Solon, 2004). Unfortunately, these comparisons are also complicated by the sensitivity of
mobility estimates to methods and samples (Solon, 2002). Nevertheless there are a number
of reasonable conclusions one can draw about the differences in mobility between countries.
First, mobility in the US is generally low compared to mobility in other OECD
countries. For example, Björklund and Jäntti (1997) find the IGE to be 0.28 for Sweden;
Corak and Heisz (1999) estimate an elasticity of 0.23 for Canada; and Couch and Dunn
(1997) report an elasticity of 0.11 for Germany.4 Britain is an exception with mobility levels
similar to that of the US (Ermisch and Francesconi, 2004).
Second, fewer studies estimate mobility in the developing world, but there is the
evidence suggests that mobility is lower in these countries (Solon, 2002). This pattern may be
caused, at least in part, by higher levels of inequality and corruption in developing countries.
For these studies, smaller sample sizes and an overall lack of quality data exacerbates the
issue of comparability.
Lastly, recent developments in the literature place an emphasis on explaining mobility.
Mechanisms that drive the persistence of income between parents and children include those
factors listed above, parental influences like the provision of social connections and genetic
transmission of ability, and non-parental factors like education reform (Nybom and Stuhler,
2014), political participation (Ichino et al., 2011), and universities (Chetty et al., 2017).
Notably, Nybom and Stuhler (2014) find that trends in mobility may not be adequately
explained by contemporaneous events if they are affected by changes in the more distant
past. The relationship between inequality and mobility has also received attention: Corak
(2013) surveys the literature on the relationship between intergenerational mobility and
income inequality in OECD countries (the so-called “Great Gatsby Curve”).
4Björklund and Jäntti (1997) and Couch and Dunn (1997) also estimate the IGE using the Panel Study
of Income Dynamics (PSID) for comparison. Both report lower US mobility.
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2.2 China
There is a growing literature on intergenerational mobility in China. However, researchers
have estimated different levels of mobility using different data sources, models, and methods
of constructing income. For example, Guo and Min (2008) estimate a low urban IGE at 0.32
using single-year observations of income, while Gong et al. (2012) find a high urban IGE of
0.63 by using averages and TS2SLS based on the same data. Disparate methodologies are
therefore a crucial explanation for why estimates diverge. Specifically, estimates of the IGE
have ranged from as low as 0.32 to as high as 0.80 in an IV approach (Yuan, 2017).
Some work also examines the patterns, trends, and mechanisms of mobility. For
example, a number of studies find that mobility is greater in rural areas based on using
rural/urban sub-samples (Qin et al., 2016; Yuan, 2017; Yuan and Chen, 2013).5 This makes
sense if individuals are able to increase their income by migrating to cities and if mobility-
inhibiting social networks (e.g., political connections) play a greater role in urban areas.
Moreover, there is evidence that mobility decreased after market reforms in the late
1970s (Chen et al., 2015; Fan, 2016). Within the reform period, Yuan and Chen (2013)
examine the years from 1988 to 2005 and estimate an early decrease in the IGE followed by
a period of relative stability and then a marked increase. Deng et al. (2013) similarly finds
a higher IGE of 0.53 in 2002 compared to an IGE of 0.47 in 1995. Zhou and Zhang (2013)
estimate relatively stable levels of mobility from 1991 to 2006 with an increase in mobility
after 2009.
Fewer studies analyze the mechanisms behind intergenerational mobility. Yuan and
Chen (2013) decompose the IGE and find human capital, social capital, and wealth explain
more than 60 percent of the variation in the elasticity. Fan (2016) examines education, social
capital, and ownership of the child’s work unit and finds that the effects vary considerably for
5Qin et al. (2016), however, find that the rural subsample shows higher persistence when using a simul-
taneous equations model, rather than an OLS model, for which they do find greater rural mobility. Qin
et al. (2016) also defines urban/rural status using the child’s residence, while Yuan (2017) and Yuan and
Chen (2013) define status using the parent’s residence.
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different income groups.6 To my knowledge, no studies have examined the effects of labor
mobility, corruption, and social capital on intergenerational mobility. These, and other
mechanisms, deserve closer attention.
3 The China Health and Nutrition Survey
This study uses longitudinal data from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS). The
survey is a collaborative project between the Carolina Population Center at the University
of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and the National Institute for Nutrition and Health at the
Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention. Its primary goal is to collect data that
allow researchers to examine the effects of health, nutrition, and family planning policies
during the past several decades of Chinese social and economic transformation.
The CHNS includes 10 waves (1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004, 2006, 2009, 2011,
and 2015).7 The survey covers 9 to 15 provinces and direct-controlled municipalities per
wave.8 The average number of households surveyed per wave ranges from 3,500 to 4,500
during the years from 1989 to 2009. That range increases to 5,900 to 7,300 with significant
expansions of the survey in the next two waves. The CHNS consists of individual, household,
and community surveys, where all individuals currently living in the household participate
in the survey. In 2015, 20,694 household members responded to the individual questionnaire.
These respondents reside in 361 communities (cities, townships and villages), which is a large
increase from around 200 communities surveyed before 2011.
The CHNS uses a multistage, random cluster sampling process for sample selection
and aims to be diverse in various socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., income, health, ed-
ucation, modernization). Counties are stratified by income and selected using a weighted
6For example, ownership of the work unit is more important for children who make below-average income.
Social capital is more significant for those with above-average income.
7I drop the 1989 wave in my analysis because that wave uses a different survey design that significantly
affects the reporting of earnings.
8The CHNS survey covers the following provinces: Beijing (2011, 2015), Chongqing (2011, 2015),
Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang (1997-on), Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu (1991-on), Liaoning (1991-on,
except for 1997), Shaanxi (2015), Shandong, Shanghai (2011, 2015), Yunnan (2015), and Zhejiang (2015).
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sampling method. Villages and townships within the counties are selected randomly. For
municipal cities, urban and suburban neighborhoods are randomly sampled.9
One advantage of the survey is that it is a large longitudinal dataset spanning 26 years.
The length and design of the survey is a benefit given the vulnerability of short panels to
attenuation bias caused by persistent transitory shocks to income (Solon, 1992; Mazumder,
2005). Another advantage of the CHNS is that it partially controls for co-residency bias,
or a selection effect in which only parents and children who are currently living together
can be observed. The survey links parents and children through a unique ID as long as
they are observed living together in at least one wave. Thus, children are connected to
their parents even after moving out. However, this does not account for children who are
never observed living with their parents in the survey.10 The selected sample differs from the
unselected individuals in several ways. Selected individuals have higher earnings, more years
of schooling, are younger and more rural than individuals not selected. I show, however, that
sample selection turns out to be insignificant. See Section 4.5 for a discussion and Appendix
Section C for estimates weighted for selection.
One disadvantage of the CHNS is the attrition of individuals and households in the
survey. Households may exit the survey for unknown reasons, though since 1997, these
households are replaced if the number of households in a community fall below 20, as well as if
respondents form a new household in the same community (Popkin et al., 2010). Individuals
who leave the household and move to a municipality or province not covered in the survey
are also not observed, though respondents may move back and re-enter the survey. While we
cannot observe the earnings of lost individuals, it is possible to examine the respondents who
are about to exit the survey (i.e., the next wave). In the full sample of males, those who are
about to leave tend to earn more than those who stay. By earnings quintiles, the proportions
9See the CHNS website for detailed information on the survey design:
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/china/about/design.
10The rate at which children are linked to fathers in the survey varies by the child’s age. For example, 83
percent of 25 year old males are linked to fathers. That number decreases to 49 and 22 percent for 35 and
45 year old males, respectively.
8
of those who exit the survey are 10%, 10%, 13%, 16%, and 16%, respectively. Thus, if it
is the case that high-earning individuals exhibit greater intergenerational persistence than
low-earners, then the estimates using the CHNS overstate the degree of mobility.
I define an individual’s annual labor earnings as the sum of an individual’s total
wages from primary and secondary jobs and their labor earnings from household activities
(farming, livestock production, fishing, and business).11 Earnings from household activities
are individualized using hours engaged in household work and the estimated productivity of
an individual (computed based on age and education). Wages are imputed if an individual
participates in a labor activity but does not report any earnings.12 I focus on earnings
because the definition of bonuses changes throughout the survey.13 Earnings are adjusted
for inflation using provincial CPI.14
Summary statistics for the estimation samples are found in Table 1. The table
presents statistics on both the father-son and father-daughter estimation samples. How-
ever, statistics for fathers are drawn from the father-son sample, since the father-son sample
is the main focus. The sample observations are father-child-year combinations that contain
fathers whose earnings are averaged over a time span of at least nine years. Note that this
means earnings may be averaged over only two observations if they occur sufficiently far
apart. I show below that the results are fairly insensitive to using different constraints.
The children in this sample earn significantly more than their fathers. A large portion
of this trend can be attributed to China’s fast-growing economy in which overall earnings
growth is also high. The sample is also restricted to those children aged 25 to 65 to minimize
life-cycle bias.15 The average age of fathers, sons, and daughters are 51, 31, and 30 years,
11See Appendix Section A for a detailed description of annual labor earnings and Appendix Section D for
descriptions of other variables.
12Imputations do not significantly change the results. For example, removing imputed wages increases
the IGE from 0.619 to 0.630 for fathers and sons after dropping 39 observations (1.3% of the sample).
13For instance, the 1991 survey simply asks for the “total value of all bonuses,” while the 2015 survey
links bonuses to income received from an occupation.
14Some existing code for data cleaning, as well as the construction of annual labor earnings, is provided
by Professor Peter.
15Some may be concerned that earnings in an individual’s twenties are not adequate approximations of
permanent income. I argue below in Section 5.4 that this is the preferred constraint given the makeup of
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respectively. 93% of sons live in rural areas and 82% are Han Chinese.
4 Empirical Models of Intergenerational Mobility
4.1 Baseline Model
Following Solon (1992), the following equations represent the relationship between short-term
proxies for long-run status and true long-run status for both parents and children:
ycit = α















The dependent variables are ycit and y
p
it, which represent the child and parent’s proxies
for long-run status in year t and s, respectively. yci and y
p
i are the child and parent’s true
long-run earnings. Acit is the age of the child and A
p
it is the age of the parent. Solving for
long-run earnings and substituting the resulting equations into equation (1) yields:
ycit = α













In this study, I focus on a baseline model that takes the form:






it + β3θt + εit, (5)
where ycit represents the log of the son’s labor earnings in year t and y
f
it represents the log of
a proxy for permanent labor earnings of child’s father. Xcit and X
p
it are vectors that contain
controls for quadratics of child and fathers’ age. I also estimate a model with additional
controls of the son’s ethnicity, current province of residence, urban residence, and the father’s
the sample and show that the estimates are robust to earnings that are observed at different ages.
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birth province. (The father’s birth province is imputed with the child’s current province if
missing.) θt represents wave or year dummies, and εit is the error term. ρ is the parameter
of interest that captures the intergenerational persistence of earnings between fathers and
children.
Using this framework, I estimate three different baseline models that address a number
of econometric challenges to estimating mobility. The first uses averages obtained over a
minimum of nine years to proxy for the father’s permanent earnings. This is the baseline
model that yields an estimate of the IGE. The second uses a father’s average percentile rank
in the earnings distribution. This model estimates the “rank slope.” The third model uses
the father’s fixed effect for earnings as a proxy for permanent earnings. This method also
produces an estimate for the IGE. In the sections that follow, I describe the models in detail
and how they address several econometric challenges.
4.2 Persistent Transitory Shocks
The attenuating effects of persistent transitory shocks to earnings are well-documented.
Following convention, I average parent earnings to proxy for permanent income. I compute
averages using a minimum time span of nine years. As noted above, this means that earnings
may be averaged using only two observations as long as they observations occur at least nine
years apart. I also average the father’s rank in the earnings distribution using the same
constraint. Mean ages for the time period in which averages are computed are used when
controlling for quadratics of age.
A drawback of this approach is that increasing the time span from which averages are
computed significantly reduces the sample size. As an alternate approach, I compute each
father’s fixed effect for earnings as a proxy for permanent income.
The fixed effects model for the father’s earnings is as follows:














yfit represents the log of fathers’ annual labor earnings. A
f
it represents the father’s age and
Xfit includes time-variant household size, marital status, and hours worked. δ
f
t are year fixed
effect and µfi represents a fixed effect component which captures time-invariant characteris-
tics like ethnicity, birth province, and so on. The permanent component of log of fathers’
earnings is estimated using the following equation:






where yfi is the permanent component of earnings for fathers at age 40 in 1991 (the first
wave). µ̂fi is the estimated fixed effect, and α is the constant term. y
f
i from equation (7) is
then used in equation (5) as a measure of permanent earnings.
4.3 Overall Earnings Growth
Estimating intergenerational mobility is also a challenge in fast-growing economies. In the
case of post-reform China, high rates of growth and earnings may swamp the effect of tran-
sitory shocks. Average earnings are highly sensitive to the years in which the observations of
earnings are drawn. To illustrate, in this sample, average annual labor earnings is 4,000 yuan
in 1991, 8,000 yuan in 2004, and 30,000 yuan in 2015 (in real terms). This is a shortcoming
for using average earnings as a proxy for permanent income. To compensate, first wave
dummies are added to control for the year in which observations are recorded. This controls
for single-year sons’ earnings on the left-hand side of the equation. Second, log earnings are
demeaned before averaging. For each survey wave, I regress log earnings on a quartic of
age and use the resultin values to compute average earnings. (Regressing on age mitigates
life-cycle bias. See below.) Sons’ earnings are similarly expressed as deviations from the
mean.
However, demeaned averages may still be prone to heteroskedasticy caused by earn-
ings growth. Therefore, I also estimate mobility using the percentile ranks of individuals in
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the earnings distributions for each wave year. Ranks are computed by regressing earnings on
a quartic of age for each survey year (the same way that earnings are demeaned). The result-
ing mobility estimate (ρ in eq. (5)) is the “rank slope” between parents and children.16 The
slope and the IGE are two distinct but related measures. Chetty et al. (2014) discusses how
both measures capture the joint distribution of parent and child percentile ranks, but only
the IGE is affected by the cross-sectional inequality of parent and child incomes. In other
words, the IGE is equal to ρyc,yf (SD(y
c)/SD(yf )), where ρyc,yf is the correlation between
the log earnings of children and parents and SD() denotes standard deviation. By construc-
tion, the ratio of the standard deviations equal one when computing percentile ranks. Given
rising income inequality, SD(yc) should be greater than SD(yf ), and consequently, the IGE
should be larger than the rank slope.
4.4 Life-cycle Bias
Estimates of the IGE are biased when observations of earnings at different points in the
life-cycle are not representative of permanent earnings. A quadratic of age and age-adjusted
percentile ranks control for the level of earnings over the life-cycle. Regressing earnings
on a quartic of age before averaging earnings or ranks (see above) similarly controls for
the earnings over the life-cycle. However, Haider and Solon (2006) shows that heteroge-
neous earnings growth over the life-cycle systematically affects estimates of the IGE when
measuring earnings at different ages for sons. For men, attenuation bias from this effect is
highest in an individual’s 20s and after their late 40s (Haider and Solon, 2006; Böhlmark and
Lindquist, 2006). Though I restrict the sample to individuals between the ages of 25 to 65,
these estimates are, fortunately, robust to measurements over the life-cycle (see Section 5.3).
Estimating the father’s fixed effect to compute permanent earnings also tries to compensate
for life-cycle bias by removing this age-related variation.
16Chetty et al. (2014) refer to this statistic as the “rank-rank slope”.
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4.5 Sample Selection
As noted above, the CHNS partially compensates for co-residency bias because children need
not reside with their parents in order to be identified as a child. As long as parents and
children are observed living together at some point in the survey, they will be linked in
future observations. However, this does not account for parents and children who are never
observed living together. Individuals who live in urban areas and have lower earnings are less
likely to be selected into the sample. To account for selection, I estimate a selection model
to weight the sample using inverse probability weights. It turns out that the mobility results
are largely insensitive to weighting, indicating that selection bias is likely insignificant. The
details for weighting are reported in Appendix Section C.
5 Overall Mobility Statistics
5.1 Transition Matrix
First, I report a transition matrix in Table 2 for fathers and sons using the sample constraints
described above. Several facts stand out. Children born into the middle quintile are more
likely to fall to the bottom of the earnings distribution than rise to the top. Moreover,
children born into the very bottom are somewhat more mobile than those born into the top,
and overall, the sample is characterized more by downward rather than upward mobility.
This is apparent when comparing entries above and below the diagonal. A statistic of
interest may be the probability of a child who is born to a father with earnings in the lowest
quintile of moving up to the highest quintile. In this sample, the probability is 10.3%.
Note, however, that the transition matrix presents data on relative earnings. In a
fast-growing economy, a child may lose their relative position but earn much more than their
parents in absolute terms. There are also floor and ceiling effects which make children born
into the bottom and top of the earnings distribution less mobile by construction (since there
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is only one direction to move). Finally, note that entries of 20 percent in each cell should not
be identified with perfect equality of opportunity (Roemer, 2004). It might be the case that
compensation for some intergenerational influences is undesirable (e.g., for the formation of
preferences or genetic transmission of ability).17
5.2 Baseline Results
Table 3 displays the baseline results. The models proxy for father’s permanent earnings in
three different ways. The first two rows present regressions that use the average of fathers’
log earnings; rows 3 and 4 use the age-adjusted percentile rank; and the last two rows use
the fixed effect estimator. The models in the odd-numbered rows are minimally controlled,
containing only quadratics of age for fathers and sons, as well as year dummies. The even-
numbered rows contain the full set of controls described above.
First, note some general patterns for the total sample and father-son sub-sample.
Mobility consistently exceeds 0.50 for the minimally controlled models, which is the largest
result previously obtained using the CHNS (Yuan, 2017). For the total sample, the IGE
using log earnings is 0.621, the rank slope is 0.572, and the IGE using the fixed effect
model is 0.525. These results are similar for the father-son sample, which has corresponding
estimates of 0.619, 0.568, and 0.524. In the fully controlled models, the estimates are smaller
(naturally), but still generally exceed 0.45. Thus, even when abstracting from important
variables that play a role in mobility, the remain fairly similar.
The specifications that use percentile rank yield estimates that are smaller than the
IGE computed using log earnings. As noted above, this occurs by construction. Rising
income inequality in China implies that the standard deviation of earnings in the child’s
generation is larger than the standard deviation of earnings in the parent’s generation, so
this inflates the IGE relative to the rank slope. On the other hand, the IGE from the fixed
effects model yields a smaller result than the rank slope.
17What matters for a philosophical account of equality of opportunity is whether the persistence of status
is ethically justified, rather than whether it happens at all.
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When comparing sub-samples, the point estimates for daughters are generally larger
than those for sons, though with larger standard errors and a much smaller sample at 632.
The rural/urban comparison is more ambiguous with some models showing greater mobility
for rural areas and others showing greater mobility for urban areas. An even smaller sub-
sample with only 395 observations may account for these results.18 This might be explained
by the effects of rural development policies or perhaps the mobility-inhibiting role of urban
networks (connections may matter more in cities than in rural areas). Future research could
try to investigative these mechanisms.
The preferred specification is the father-son estimate that uses percentile ranks to
estimate mobility (row 3, column 2). This yields an rank slope of 0.568. For reasons described
above, this specification is most effective at accounting for life-cycle bias and overall earnings
growth. It is also the most robust specification to additional sample restrictions based on
the child’s earnings rank (e.g., limiting to children between 5th and 95th percentiles).19 For
the rest of the paper, I will refer only to the father-son sub-sample as the main focus of the
study.
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Estimates of intergenerational mobility may be biased downwards if short-term proxies are
not an adequate approximations of long-run earnings (Solon, 1992). Figure I shows how the
rank slope vary according to different average earnings constraints. The rank slope is fairly
stable when averaging earnings over minimum time spans of 3-15 years. After 15 years, the
rank slope declines sharply due to a steep drop off in the number of usable observations. This
is apparent from the numbers in the plot region of the figure, which represent the number
of usable observations that correspond to the indicated constraint.
18The comparison is also ambiguous when defining rural and urban sub-samples by an individual’s hukou
registration type. Average log earnings and rank specifications show more mobility in rural areas, while the
fixed effects model shows more mobility in urban areas. Using this definition, the urban sub-sample is larger
at n = 708.
19Somewhat surprisingly, all three measures are highly robust across similar restrictions used for the
father’s earnings.
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Table IV reports the sensitivity of the rank slope (with only age and wave controls) to
alternate specifications. The estimates are fairly robust. Row 1 displays the rank slope using
only the oldest sons. Earnings for the oldest sons in the family might be more representative
of his long-run status than earnings for younger sons are for theirs (Solon, 1992). I find that
this restriction only slightly increases the rank slope by 0.1 to 0.578.
Row 2 restricts the sample to sons who are at least 30 years old. Contrary to Haider
and Solon (2006), who find that measuring income in the 30s and 40s produce a higher
IGE (because those incomes better approximate lifetime earnings), the rank slope in this
restricted sample decreases to 0.528. A significant loss in sample size may explain this
result, as 43% of sons in the sample are 25 to 29 years old.20 Thus, I choose to keep sons
who are at least 25 years old.21
Using an annual measure of earnings for children omits observations with zero and
negative earnings. I include these observations by averaging the sons’ earnings over a mini-
mum time span of nine years (same as fathers) in Row 3. The resulting estimate is virtually
the same as the baseline at 0.569. The number of observations in this specification is small
(since father-son pairs are only counted once). However, the point estimate is fairly robust
to additional changes in the time span constraint for fathers and sons even for this specifica-
tion. There might also be concerns about using a time span constraint that allows earnings
to be averaged using a small number of observations (i.e., as long as they are observed over
a period of at least nine years). Therefore, in row 4, I average the father’s earnings using a
minimum of four non-missing earnings observations instead of a time span constraint. The
rank slope using this requirement is 0.578, which is very similar to the baseline.
20The estimate is also fairly robust to other specifications. Restricting to individuals aged 25 to 50 years
old yields an estimate of 0.537, which is somewhat unexpected given evidence that the earnings of older men
attenuate estimates of mobility (Haider and Solon, 2006). Restricting to individuals aged 25 to 35 years old
yields a rank slope of 0.548.
21I conjecture that earnings measured at younger ages in China might better approximate permanent
earnings than earnings measured at the same age in the US. Chinese young adults should enter the labor
market at a younger age if they receive less schooling compared to those in developed countries. This
may mean that a 25 year old has considerable work experience at the time of measurement and that this
measurement better approximates long-run earnings.
17
Finally, I examine mobility using household earnings. Household earnings are defined
as the sum of household labor earnings and total wage labor earnings from each household
member. Households are ranked in the household earnings distribution using households
linked to fathers and sons. The estimate is very large at 0.856, and may be a result of
assortative mating.22 Using individual earnings may overestimate mobility if the father’s
socioeconomic status is more accurately represented by his household’s status. For instance,
a father may live with a high-earning spouse and therefore in a high-earning household. In
this case, the son comes from a rich household but from a low-earning father. If the son is
rich, he is apparently mobile with respect to his father, but not for his parents’ household.
5.4 Absolute Mobility
The IGE and rank slope characterize relative mobility. That is, the relative outcomes of
children with poor versus rich parents. Thus, relative mobility may be high or low both if
children are moving up or down in the earnings distribution. Distinct from relative mobil-
ity, however, is absolute mobility, which measures the outcomes of children from different
backgrounds in absolute terms.
I measure absolute mobility by computing the probability of a child with a father
at the 25th percentile of the earnings distribution having earnings above the international
poverty line (defined by the World Bank as $1.90 USD/day in 2011 PPP terms).23 Following
Chetty et al. (2014), I compute this statistic by regressing an indicator for being above the
poverty line on the fathers’ average rank. Average rank is computed the same way as above.
I also include quadratics of fathers’ and sons’ age and wave dummies as controls. Then,
using the fitted values, I find that 57% of sons are above the poverty line with fathers at the
25th percentile of the earnings distribution.24
22Controlling for the size of the father’s and son’s household yields a similar estimate of 0.840.
23The international poverty line in US dollars is adjusted for inflation using annual CPI (total items
excluding food and energy). CPI and PPP data are both obtained from the OECD.
24Note that the annual poverty line is 2,495.5 yuan in 2015 prices and the average fathers’ earnings is
2,177 yuan. Comparisons with Chetty et al. (2014) are difficult because of different methods. For example,
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This result is somewhat surprising given that rapid economic growth in China has
lifted millions out of poverty in the span of only a few decades. There could be a number
of explanations for this result. First, the degree of absolute mobility may be understated
due to selection if sons who make more than their parents are less likely to appear in the
sample. This selection effect is apparent when examining Table II, where the transition
matrix shows greater downward than upward mobility (i.e., more sons above the diagonal).
Absolute mobility might also be underestimated if many sons are above the poverty line with
respect to income rather than earnings, and if individuals below the poverty line are actually
well-off because of aid received from other household members. On the other hand, low rates
of absolute mobility may not be too surprising given the degree of poverty that still remains
in China. The enduring problem is evidenced by Xi Jinping’s decision to make poverty
alleviation one of his signature policy issues. Moreover, widespread corruption, restrictions
on labor mobility, and other mobility-inhibiting policies may also play a role in affecting
rates of both absolute and relative mobility.
6 Intergenerational Effects of Schooling Shocks
This section examines the effects of schooling shocks on intergenerational mobility.25 Section
6.1 discusses the historical background. Section 6.2 defines schooling shocks, and Section 6.3
lays out the empirical strategy. Section 6.4 reports the results. Finally, Section 6.5 explains
the results with a theoretical model that incorporates shocks to educational attainment.
6.1 Historical Background
20th century China was an extraordinary time of change. During this time, China saw the
Communist Revolution, Great Leap Forward (GLF), Cultural Revolution, and economic
they focus on the US Census-defined poverty line and household earnings for both males and females, while
I focus on the international poverty line for fathers and sons only.
25Note that the use of the term “shocks” is different here than above when used to discuss transitory
shocks to earnings.
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reforms with the Reform and Opening Up policies that began in the late 1970s. For the
fathers in the CHNS sample, three events are relevant for explaining trends in educational
attainment: famine during the GLF, the Cultural Revolution, and Reform and Opening
Up.26
The GLF was an economic campaign aimed at rapid collectivization and industrial-
ization that took place between 1958-1962. During this time, policy failures and bad weather
produced a massive famine from 1959-1961, most severe in rural areas, with significant con-
sequences for the educational attainment of certain groups. Treiman (2013) describes the
impact. Cohorts entering primary and secondary school around the time of famine (born
1949-1953) had a decrease in the proportion of kids attaining those levels of education. The
modal age of entry into primary school being eight years old explains why cohorts born from
1951-1953 were affected. There were, however, a substantial proportion of kids who entered
school at ages older than eight, which explains why children born as early as 1949 were
affected by the Famine (Treiman, 2013).27
The 1966-1976 Cultural Revolution was the next major event following the GLF.
The Cultural Revolution, initiated by Mao, was a movement intended to eradicate bourgeois
culture from Chinese society, and had significant effects on education as well. For example,
most secondary schools were completely closed from 1966-1968, and most tertiary schools
were closed from 1966-1972 (Bernstein, 1977). However, at the same time, the proportion
attaining secondary school education actually increased for the total population (Treiman,
2013). This is because many secondary schools were opened in rural areas to promote school-
ing among peasants. People previously without access to secondary education benefited as a
result (as primary school attainment was already nearly universal.) It is important to note,
however, that during this time schooling expansion benefited students and teachers from
privileged political backgrounds (i.e., peasants and Communist Party members) rather than
26See Treiman (2013) for a detailed explanation of trends in 20th century educational attainment in China.
27For instance, 33% of rural children born between 1949-1952 who had any education entered primary
school later than age 8 (Treiman, 2013).
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those who would stand to gain based solely on academic merit (Treiman, 2013). Thus, many
of these new schools were inferior in quality.
The school closures described above took place mostly in urban areas. Note that
when these schools re-opened, education was focused more on ideological indoctrination than
the conventional curriculum, which was only restored in 1977 (Treiman, 2013). Moreover,
millions of urban youth experienced interruptions to schooling as a result of forced rustication
(Li et al., 2010). The “send-down” movement was motivated by a number of factors: reducing
urban unemployment, increasing agricultural productivity, as well as “reeducation” and the
instillment of good socialist values (Bernstein, 1977; Li et al., 2010). Forced rustication
began on a small scale in the 1950s, was formally initaited in 1967, and ended in 1978 (Li
et al., 2010). In total, approximately 17 million urban adolescents (most aged 16-19) were
sent down to the countryside to live and work alongside rural peasants.28 Consequently,
urban kids of secondary school age during the beginning of the Cultural Revolution were the
most affected cohorts. Deng and Treiman (1997) specifically designate cohorts born between
1950-1957 as those most affected by the Cultural Revolution (i.e., those between nine and 16
years old at the start of the Revolution and between 16 and 27 years old at the end). Thus, it
turns out that similar urban and rural birth cohorts experience large schooling interruptions,
but largely for different reasons (famine for the former, and rustication for the latter).29
Finally, there were cohorts affected by the end of the Cultural Revolution and eco-
nomic reform. After the end of the Cultural Revolution, the emphasis on academic merit
was restored and many of the schools opened during the Revolution were closed down. This
had the effect of decreasing educational attainment for these cohorts. At the same time,
economic reforms, by raising incomes and living standards, increased the opportunity costs
of schooling for kids. This is especially true for rural households where farming was made
much more profitable from the “household responsibility system,” which allowed surplus
28Most returned to urban areas. Only around 5% of sent-down youths stayed in the rural areas because
of marriage of assignment to local jobs (Li et al., 2010).
29Urban areas experienced the effects of famine as well, but they were not as hard hit as rural areas
(Almond et al., 2010).
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crops to be sold at market value (crops being previously produced according to a quota
system). Thus, for many families, it was more advantageous to have children work then go
to school.
In the reform period, primary school attainment was unaffected, but the proportions
attaining secondary school education decreased. If the modal year of secondary school entry
is 13 (Treiman, 2013), then cohorts born beginning in 1961 are affected for policies imple-
mented in 1979. In other words, a child born in 1961 is in year five of secondary school when
reforms are officially implemented (though reforms are widespread only in the early 1980s).
Again, since many children entered primary school later than eight years of age, cohorts
born around 1960 are affected as well (Treiman, 2013).
6.2 Defining Shocks
The goal is to estimate how these shocks to schooling affect the educational attainment and
earnings of fathers and sons in the CHNS sample. It is not possible, however, to infer shocks
simply from an individual’s birth cohort. With so many events going on at the same time,
a different approach is required to estimate the persistence of shocks. Therefore, I define
shocks at the cell-level. I use the 1990 Chinese National Population Census (1% IPUMS
sample) to estimate the following model:30
sjc = β1(trendjc) + β2(trendjc) + εjc. (8)
, sjc is the average years of schooling for cell j and birth cohort c. Cells are defined by birth
province, gender, rural/urban registration type, and birth cohort. trendjc is a trend variable
that equals the cohort’s birth year minus 1919. The model is estimated separately for each
birth province and rural/urban registration type. I restrict the sample to males and drop
30The choice of the 1990 Census is motivated by concerns about differential mortality rates by education.
It is likely the case that those with less years of schooling are less likely to survive into old age, which explains
the differences in educational attainment found in different Censuses (Treiman, 2013).
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those older than 70 years old in the 1990 census.
εjc is the error term and represents deviations from the fitted trend using this model.
These “schooling residuals” are interpreted as shocks. I label negative shocks as “schooling
interruptions” and positive shocks “schooling promotions”. Note that this model accounts
for shocks that differ by birth cohort, gender, birth province, and rural/urban area. These
characteristics are significant because areas were shocked differently within the same cohort.31
Figure II plots the rural schooling residuals on the vertical axis against birth cohort
on the horizontal axis. The schooling residuals follow the trend described above. Cohorts
affected by famine, born 1949-1953, experience large schooling interruptions. For cohorts
born between 1953-1960, there is a steady increase in the residuals, reflecting gains from the
Cultural Revolution. Finally, after topping out around 1960, there is a sharp decrease which
reflects school closures after the Revolution as well as economic reforms.
There are, however, a cluster of large negative schooling residuals in birth cohorts born
in 1964 and 1965 that likely do not reflect increased opportunity costs to schooling. This
is apparent when comparing to residuals computed using the 2000 Census. These residuals
likely reflect incomplete schooling by individuals surveyed in 1990 and do not reflect the true
level of schooling for these cohorts. I also remove outliers at the 1st and 99th percentiles with
respect to standardized residuals and influential observations (dfbeta estimates).32
Figure III reports the corresponding schooling residuals for urban registrants. The
pattern follows a similar shape as the rural shocks, but for different reasons (as described
above). Schooling interruptions are most severe around cohorts born between 1950 and
1955, which is consistent with the predicted effects from the send-down movement during the
Cultural Revolution. The decline in educational attainment after 1960 is also less pronounced
relative to the rural sub-sample. Market reforms increased the opportunity costs of schooling
for farmers more than non-farmers, so this result is to be expected.
31For instance, central provinces and rural areas were hit harder by famine than northeastern provinces
and urban areas (Almond et al., 2010).
32Removing outliers is important especially for models in which there are a small number of observations.
The qualitative results are not affected.
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6.3 Empirical Strategy
I examine four relationships: the effect of shocks on years of schooling and log average
earnings for individuals in two generations: the directly affected cohorts and their sons.
Note that for the former, individuals need not actually be fathers. I estimate the following
model for all individuals born in the relevant time period. For the latter, sons must have an
affected father to be selected into the sample.
Let ξi = εjc and ξ
f
i = εjc. The general empirical models are as follows:
Yit = β1ξi + β2ξ
2
i + β3ψit (9)







Yit is the relevant dependent variable that represents either schooling or earnings for indi-
viduals in the directly affected generation. ξi is the schooling shock for individual i that
is linked to cell j and birth cohort c. ψitit are controls for age and years when earnings
are on the left-hand side. Superscript s in eq. (10) indicates that the variable corresponds
to sons in the second generation. In this case, ξfi has superscript f and is linked to the
son’s father. In this generation, I also incorporate schooling shocks into the empirical model
of mobility used in the baseline estimates above by interacting fathers’ earnings with the
shock. Including the shock alongside fathers’ income tests to see whether shocks have an
effect on the earnings of sons independent of the fathers’ earnings. In urban areas, where
forced rustication generated many positive externalities like greater social capital (Li et al.,
2010), the shock might exert a significant effect in this model.
As noted above, I drop cohorts born after 1963 to eliminate individuals with incom-
plete schooling at the time of 1990 Census. I also limit the sample to cohorts born after the
end of the Communist Revolution in 1949. This is necessary for two reasons. First, the status
of education differs for those born pre- and post-Revolution. From 1949 to the reform period
beginning in the late 1970s and early 1980s, an individual’s designated “class” (good, middle,
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or bad) was of great significance for educational and earnings attainment. Individuals with
intelligentsia origins from before the Revolution were designated as “middle-class,” which
put them at a disadvantage with respect to schooling admission and employment (Deng and
Treiman, 1997). Thus, those who went to school after the Revolution had different status
than those who were educated before. In rural areas, those from “good” class backgrounds
(e.g., peasants, cadres, military personnel) received schooling promotions and employment
advantages. When comparing similarly educated individuals who receive schooling before
and after the Revolution in rural areas, it should be the case that the former earn less than
the latter. In urban areas as well, education had different consequences for earnings before
and after 1949. Post-Revolution urban cohorts experienced schooling that focused on ideo-
logical indoctrination rather than the conventional curriculum (Treiman, 2013). In this case,
the returns to schooling for the affected groups should be diminished for individuals born
after 1949.
Limiting the sample to those born after 1949 also ensures that individuals in the
sample experienced the same institutional environment (Communist rule) in early childhood.
Take, as an example, two rural children from educated family backgrounds born in 1945
and 1950. They may both begin schooling after 1949, but the family of the latter child is
more likely to experience harassment and prejudice during the child’s early years (as the
intellectual class was less targeted before 1949). Given the importance of early childhood
on adult outcomes (e.g., Heckman, 2006), I try to isolate the sample to only those who have
lived their entire lives under Communist rule.
6.4 Results
Table V reports the results for rural registrants. Column (1) reports the effect of schooling
residuals on years of schooling. The effect is strongly linear, indicating that shocks to the
relevant groups are closely related to years of schooling on the individual level. This is
also apparent in Figure III, which displays the predicted values from the models in Table
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V graphically. Panel A, which corresponds to column (1), plots years of schooling against
schooling residuals and shows a clear linearly increasing trend.
Column (2) shows that shocks exert a significant positive effect on earnings through
the quadratic term, albeit by a very small amount. The small effect is likely explained, in
part, by low quality schooling expansion that decreased returns to schooling. The linear
term is insignificant and negative, though Panel B displays a U-shape for the correspond-
ing predicted values. This is a somewhat puzzling result as those linked to large schooling
interruptions are those who experienced famine. Their earnings advantage might be ex-
plained by different rates of mortality for those who experienced famine. That is to say,
those who survived were more likely to have higher earnings than those who perished would
have had if they had survived as well. However, note again that the linear term is negative
but insignificant for this model.
Next, I estimate the persistence of schooling shock effects into the next generation.
Column (3) shows that increased schooling shocks for the father lead to increased schooling
for the sons with a significantly positive quadratic term. The effect on son’s education,
however, is less strong than the effect in the previous generation. Panel C in Figure III
displays the predicted values that show an increasing trend with a slight uptick for sons who
have negatively shocked fathers. This may reflect the persistence of status from their fathers
on the left-hand side of the U-shape in Panel B.
Column (4) estimates the shock effects on sons’ earnings. The effect is negative
but insignificant on the linear term and positive on the quadratic term. This creates a
large U-shape in Panel D of Figure III.33 Again, this could be explained by differential
mortality, where the advantages of negatively and positively shocked fathers persist into
the next generation. It might also be that fathers who experienced schooling interruptions
invest more into their children relative to those who received positive shocks. That is to
say, preferences for parental investment into the child are a function of the shock. This
33Note that Panels B and D in Figures IV and V are scaled differently on the vertical axis.
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mechanism is explored further below.
Incorporating the shocks into the model of intergenerational mobility tests whether
shocks exert an effect on the son’s earnings independent of an effect through the father’s earn-
ings. Column (5) reports that while positive shocks have positive effects on sons’ earnings,
this result is insignificant. Fathers’ earnings remain highly significant.
Table VI and Figure V reports the analogous models and predicted values for in-
dividuals registered in urban areas. Column (1) and Panel A in Figure V similarly shows
that residuals have a positive effect on schooling. Column (2), however, reports a significant
negative effect of schooling promotions on earnings. This is consistent with Li et al. (2010),
who find greater earnings for sent-down youth. This somewhat counterintuitive result is ex-
plained by greater Communist Party membership and employment rates among rusticated
youth, as well as low quality schooling and high unemployment in urban areas. Panel B
displays the trend that decreases at a decreasing rate.
Shocks also positively affect sons’ schooling (with a slightly smaller magnitude than
for fathers). The linear term in column (3) is positive and Panel C shows an increasing
trend. In column (4), the linear term is negative but insignificant, while the quadratic term
is significantly positive. The predicted values in Panel D of Figure V resembles the pattern
in Panel B, but with larger confidence interval bands. The picture painted by this figure is
consistent with the benefits that accrued to sent-down fathers who were able to earn more
than their counterparts who stayed and received schooling in the cities. The fact that the
linear term is negative but insignificant indicates that effects do not strongly persist into the
next generation. Finally, in the model of intergenerational mobility in column (5), residuals
do not exhibit an independent effect on sons’ earnings (though the effect is negative as
hypothesized).
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6.5 A Model of Shocks and Intergenerational Mobility
The following stylized model, adapted from Solon (2004), incorporates schooling shocks to
a theory of intergenerational mobility and shows how divergent preferences among parents
for investment into children can explain the patterns described above. The parent’s utility
is Upit, and is a function of her own consumption, c
p
it, and her child’s log earnings, log(y
c
it).





In eq. (11), α is sometimes referred to as the “altruism parameter” and reflects the degree
to which the parent’s utility depends on his child’s future earnings (Solon, 2004).
The parent’s budget constraint can be expressed as the sum of consumption, invest-






The child’s earnings function equals the the product of parental investment and the










Using the parent’s budget constraint and the child’s earnings function in eq. (12) and
(13), the parent’s utility function can be rewritten as follows:











The first-order condition for maximizing utility with respect to investment and the
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Substituting this result into the parent’s budget constraint and the child’s earnings

















The child’s earnings under optimal investment is thus a function of the altruism
parameter, the rate of return on parental investment, parental income, the schooling shock,
and the child’s endowment.
I assume that a schooling shock, ξpi , directly affects parental schooling and earnings.
While the effect is positive for schooling, the effect on earnings depends on the institutional
environment an individual is in (rural or urban). Suppose the parent earnings under optimal












where β indicates the sign and scales the effect of ξpi . Using this framework and the empirical
results described above, β > 0 if the parent is registered in a rural area and β < 0 if the parent
is registered in an urban area. The effects of the schooling shock can then be represented by
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differentiating parent and child earnings with respect to ξpi :
∂ypit
∂ξpi
> 0 (rural) (21)
∂ycit
∂ξpi
> 0 (rural) (22)
∂ypit
∂ξpi
< 0 (urban) (23)
∂ycit
∂ξpi
< 0 (urban). (24)
The results of this simplified model is largely consistent with the picture painted by
the empirical results. The exception are the rural individuals whose earnings seem to exhibit
a U-shape with respect to the shock (Panel B and D, Figure IV). This U-shape is statistically
insignificant in the first generation, but significant for sons in the next. This pattern could
be explained if the altruism parameter α varies as a function of the shock.34 Parents whose
cohort and province receive large negative shocks may feel an increased desire to maximize
their child’s well-being, i.e., to give their children a better life than the one they had. This
reflects the “altruism” inherent in the altruism parameter. Of course, given diminished
earnings and standards of living for those parents who receive large negative shocks, it may
be the case that parents find the best chance to increase their personal or family’s well-being
is to invest in their children so that their children can, in turn, invest back into the family.
This may be an especially strong motivation in China, where children are widely expected
to care for their parents in old age. If this is the case, then ∂α
∂ξ0is
< 0, which implies that the


























34Some evidence shows that parents compensate in investment when disadvantageous life events occur
(Grätz, 2015).
30
It is apparent that the signs of optimal investment and child earnings are both am-
biguous. Either might be positive or negative depending on which factor (parent earnings
or altruism) is more significant. Fathers who experience schooling interruptions may invest
their earnings at a higher rate than fathers who experience schooling promotions, and this
generates the U-shape in earnings for sons in Panel D of Figure IV.
This simple model illustrates a mechanism that explains the empirical results above.
Schooling shocks affect earnings differently based on the institutional environment. For
fathers in rural areas who experience schooling interruptions during famine, it may also
be the case that disadvantaged fathers compensate for the effects of their social status by
investing more in their children, while advantaged fathers do not capitalize on all of their
resources to benefit their sons.
7 Conclusion
This study makes two main contributions to our understanding of intergenerational mobility
and the persistence of social status in China. First, I provide new estimates of the overall
intergenerational earnings mobility. Using a new measure of annual labor earnings that is
less prone to measurement error, I show that mobility in China is lower than previously
thought. I show that for fathers and sons, the preferred estimate of the rank slope is 0.568.
This implies that, on average, almost 60% of earnings are passed on from fathers to sons.
This result is robust to a number of econometric specifications. To my knowledge, this study
is also the first to estimate absolute mobility in China, where I find that sons born with
fathers in the 25th percentile of the earnings distribution have a 55% chance of attaining
annual earnings greater than the international poverty line. While economic reforms have
brought a remarkable increase in living standards over the past several decades, the story
told by these statistics indicates that there is still progress to be made with respect to both
absolute and relative mobility.
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This study also examines the intergenerational effects of events like the Great Leap
Forward and Cultural Revolution. I find that shocks to schooling attainment for cohorts are
closely related to outcomes for schooling and earnings in two generations. In rural areas,
schooling expansions during the Cultural Revolution increased schooling and earnings for the
individuals affected and their sons. Famine diminished the earnings of the individuals directly
affected, but sons were able to overcome the shock, perhaps through stronger preferences
for investment into the child among fathers who experienced famine. At the same time,
I provide evidence that sent-down urban youth during the Cultural Revolution attained
greater earnings relative to those who stayed behind in the cities. This earnings advantage
is also passed down to their sons. Thus, despite immense changes from economic reforms,
these large-scale sociopolitical events nevertheless exert significant intergenerational effects.
Moving up the economic ladder is clearly still a challenge in China. Relative mobility
in China lags behind other countries, while income inequality remains persistent. Increasing
social mobility entails policy that is informed about the mechanisms of intergenerational
mobility. These mechanisms may include factors like geographic mobility and social capital,
which may play an especially significant role in China, given restrictions imposed by the
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Variables N Mean SD Min Max
Father variables
Average earnings 2,952 6,688.3 7,285.3 603.3 153,126.6
Average age 2,952 53.0 5.0 34.5 60.75
Son variables
Annual earnings 2,952 18,364.2 37,894.3 3.6 896,993.9
Age 2,952 32.1 6.0 25 65
Daughter variables
Annual earnings 632 15,203.0 18,260.7 1.1 209,703.9
Age 632 30.7 5.9 25 57
Notes: Fathers and sons are the main focus of the study, so statistics for fa-
thers are from the father-son sample. The annual earnings variable summa-
rizes the annual earnings observations used for the average of fathers’ earnings
in the estimation sample. Both father-son and father-daughter samples are
limited to observations (father-child-year combinations) that use fathers’ earn-
ings averaged using two observations that occur over a time span of at least
nine years. Average earnings for fathers are reported as the mean of nine year
averages used in the estimation sample. Average age statistics for fathers is
similarly the average age over the period in which a father has non-missing






Son Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
1 32.5% 24.1% 21.6% 14.7% 7.2%
2 25.0% 26.3% 21.8% 15.5% 11.5%
3 16.0% 19.2% 20.5% 22.2% 22.1%
4 16.4% 15.8% 17.6% 25.8% 24.4%
5 10.3% 13.9% 18.3% 22.0% 35.5%
Notes: Each cell is the percentage of children with earnings in the quintile given by the row, conditional on
having a father who has earnings in the quintile given by the column. Father’s earnings are averaged over a




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Sons Daughters Rural Urban
1. Log Average Earnings 0.621*** 0.619*** 0.675*** 0.569*** 0.832***
Age and Wave Controls (0.037) (0.041) (0.085) (0.040) (0.161)
2. Log Average Earnings 0.480*** 0.492*** 0.480*** 0.492*** 0.419***
Full Controls (0.041) (0.045) (0.105) (0.044) (0.130)
3. Average Rank 0.572*** 0.568*** 0.643*** 0.537*** 0.569***
Age and Wave Controls (0.027) (0.031) (0.058) (0.030) (0.087)
4. Average Rank 0.439*** 0.451*** 0.466*** 0.430*** 0.557***
Full Controls (0.031) (0.035) (0.066) (0.033) (0.093)
5. Fixed Effects 0.544*** 0.545*** 0.590*** 0.517*** 0.485***
Age and Wave Controls (0.034) (0.039) (0.069) (0.038) (0.109)
6. Fixed Effects 0.449*** 0.466*** 0.435*** 0.456*** 0.483***
Full Controls (0.038) (0.043) (0.082) (0.040) (0.126)
Observations 3,584 2,952 632 3,189 395
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Children with zero or negative earnings are dropped for
the percentile rank specification in order to maintain consistency in the number of observations





1. Oldest Sons 0.578*** 2,474
(0.034)
2. Minimum Age 30 0.528*** 1,692
(0.044)
3. Average Child Earnings 0.569*** 388
(0.064)
4. Minimum 4 Observations 0.578*** 2,811
(0.032)
5. Household Earnings 0.856*** 13,877
(0.013)
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The reported estimates are the
rank slope with only age and wave controls. The dependent variable
for rows 1 through 4 is the son’s age-adjusted rank in the individual
earnings distribution. The corresponding explanatory variable is the
father’s earnings averaged over a time span of at least nine years. The
first row limits the sample to the oldest sons in the family. The second
row requires all sons to be at least 30 years old, while being ranked
against other sons who are at least 30 years old. Row 3 averages the
son’s earnings over a period of at least nine years. Row 4 requires the
father’s earnings to be averaged using a minimum of four non-missing
earnings observations. In row 5, the dependent variable is the son’s
household’s rank in the household earnings distribution. The explana-


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































0 3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24
Minimum Time Span (Years)
Note: This figure displays the sensitivity of the rank slope to the minimum number of
years used to compute average fathers’ earnings. The numbers printed in the graph
region represent the number of observations that can be used to compute the rank
slope after imposing the constraint indicated by the dotted line.
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Figure II
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Birth cohort
Note: This figure displays the shocks to schooling received by different birth cohorts
for individuals with rural area registration. Schooling shocks are defined as schooling
residuals, or the deviations from the predicted value of schooling for each group in a
given birth cohort, province, and rural/urban area.
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Figure III
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Birth cohort
Note: This figure displays the shocks to schooling received by different birth cohorts
for individuals with urban area registration. Schooling shocks are defined as schooling
residuals, or the deviations from the predicted value of schooling for each group in a
given birth cohort, province, and rural/urban area.
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Figure IV
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Note: This figure displays the shocks to schooling received by different birth cohorts. Schooling
shocks are defined as schooling residuals, or the deviations from the predicted value of schooling
for each birth cohort in a given province and rural/urban area.
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Figure V
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Note: This figure displays the shocks to schooling received by different birth cohorts. Schooling
shocks are defined as schooling residuals, or the deviations from the predicted value of schooling
for each birth cohort in a given province and rural/urban area.
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Appendix
A Construction of Annual Labor Earnings (Joint With
Klara Peter)
Earnings are constructed from an individual’s wage earnings from primary and secondary
jobs, earnings from collective and household farming, and earnings from household business.
Annual wage labor income is the product of the reported average monthly wage and number
of months worked. Values for months worked are imputed with the sample median value of
months worked if the respondent reports working but has zero or a missing value for number
of months worked. This affects 3% of the sample. Values for monthly wage are imputed by
regression imputation if the respondent reports working but no average monthly wage. The
log of average monthly wage is regressed on log hours, job sector, a female dummy, quadratic
for age, ethnicity, schooling levels, residence stratum (city, suburbs, town or county capital,
rural), and province dummies. The appropriate values are then replaced by the exponential
of the predicted value summed with half of the mean squared error. 5% of values are imputed
by this step.
Earnings from collective and household activities are computed assuming heteroge-
neous individual productivity levels. The CHNS provides data on how many hours a re-
spondent works in each collective and household activity. These activities include household
business, farming, fishing, gardening, livestock production, and collective farming. Hours
are imputed if an individual reports working but their reported average hours worked per
week is missing. Values are imputed using the same regression imputation as above after
regressing the log of hours worked per week on a female dummy, quadratic of age, geographic
residence, residence stratum, and province and year dummies. Hours are then aggregated by
individual and year, and the individual’s hourly contribution to household labor is computed
by dividing her share of hours worked by the total number of hours contributed to household
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activities.
Different components of household income are then aggregated. Quantities and prices
of crops are surveyed from 1989 to 1997. Gross income from crop production is computed as
the quantity of crops produced multiplied by the free market price, plus the quantity crops
of sold to the government multiplied by the difference between government and free market
prices. Gross income from livestock production, fishing, gardening, and small business is
obtained by adding the value of sold, consumed, and given away goods last year.
Household income is imputed if respondents indicate that their household engaged
in an activity (production, sales, consumptions, gifting), but the values for production are
missing. There are two income elements to household farming and business: sales and
consumption. If either or both elements are missing, values are imputed in a multi-step
regression sequence.
In the case of missing consumption, logs of consumption are regressed on the log of
sales and the log of costs of production, dummies for household activity, year, province, urban
status, log of the total household hours worked by all household members in a given activity,
average years of schooling of household members engaged in a given activity, and the number
of household members engaged in a given activity (total, over 16, and over 60). The next
model takes the same form but excludes the costs of production. The final model includes
sales, costs, and only the dummy variables specified above. In all three models, predicted
values are obtained and imputed for either consumption or sales. The same procedure is
followed for missing sales data.
If both income elements are missing, values are imputed in four steps. First, log
of production is regressed on costs, and the dummy and household variables listed above.
Then, log of production is regressed on dummy and household variables alone. Third, log
of production is regressed on costs and dummy variables, and finally, log of production is
regressed on dummy variables alone. Values are predicted and imputed at each step.
Costs of production are imputed in a two-step sequence if missing. First, log of costs
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are regressed on log of production, dummy, and household variables. Then, log of costs are
regressed on household variables only. Again, values are predicted and imputed at each step.
Household expenses are treated as investment if expenses exceed gross income by more
than 50 percent. Investment made from previous savings are not considered as a component
of gross labor income.
The goal of individualizing household earnings while taking adjusting for productivity
is to attain a more accurate measure of individual earnings. Intuitively, an individual is more
productive if they are in their prime working years or more educated. To that end, household
earnings are individualized with an adjustment weight that accounts for productivity. First,
log of wages are regressed on schooling years, a quadratic of age, and year and province
dummies. The index is generated by taking the products of an individual’s schooling, age,
and age squared with their respective coefficients, then multiplying by individual’s hourly
contribution to household labor. The adjustment weight is generated by dividing the value
of the index by the total sum of the index that is aggregated by activity, household, and
year. The final adjusted value of individualized household earnings is the product of the
unadjusted share of household earnings based on hours and the adjustment weight.
Finally, earnings from collective farming is measured as the total cash and in-kind
payments for labor in collective farming outside a regular job.35 Annual labor earnings are
generated by adding the total wage earned from primary and secondary jobs, earnings from
collective farming, and productivity-adjusted earnings from household farming and business.
Earnings are inflated to 2014 price levels using provincial CPI. (Respondents report income
from the year preceding the survey year.)
35In the entire survey, only 369 observations received cash or in-kind payments from collective farms. The




The raw sample contains 185,365 observations and includes all individuals surveyed from
1989 to 2015 regardless of whether they are linked to any parents. There are a number
of constraints imposed to obtain the estimation samples. For instance, the 1989 did not
ask respondents about the number of months they worked in the prior year. Annual wage
earnings are obtained for the 1991 to 2015 waves by multiplying months worked by average
monthly wage. Dropping the initial CHNS wave leaves 169,442 observations.
I focus on the relationship between fathers and children in the estimation sample.
Dropping individuals not linked to fathers eliminates over half of the remaining observations
and reduces the sample to 72,106 father-child-year combinations. Next, I restrict ages so
children are no younger than 25 years old and no older than 65 years old. The sample reduces
to 25,484 observations. I also require that averages of father’s earnings are computed over
a minimum of 15 years. This constraint leaves 14,095 observations. Note that respondents
from the provinces added in 2011 and 2015 are excluded from the sample because earnings
averages for fathers in these provinces cannot be computed over a period of at least nine
years. Of the 14,095 observations, 8,075 are father-son-year combinations and 6,020 are
father-daughter-year combinations. Dropping sons with zero or missing earnings leaves 2,957
observations with 1,309 unique father-son pairs. The same constraint for daughters leaves a
sample size of 634 with 390 unique father-daughter pairs. I also drop 5 observations in the
father-son sample and 2 observations in the father-daughter sample without schooling years
data for the child. This is allows the number of observations used for the baseline results to
match the number of observations in the selection adjusted results with inverse probability
weights that are generated using schooling year data. The result is virtually unchanged after
dropping these observations. The final estimation sample sizes for sons and daughters are
thus 2,952 and 632, with 1,304 and 388 unique parent-child pairs, respectively.
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C Weighting for Sample Selection
To correct for sample selection, the baseline models are re-estimated with inverse probability
weights. The weights are generated with a probit model that regresses an indicator for sample
selection on a quadratic of age, schooling years, ethnicity, urban status, female, province, and
year dummies, as well as three instruments for selection that relate to geographic mobility.
Each is a municipal-level variable. The first two are immigration and emigration levels: the
share of the population, aged 16-60, born in other provinces and the percentage of people who
worked out of town for more than one month last year. The third is an index that reflects a
municipality’s level of transportation infrastructure based on its most common type of road
and proximity to train and bus stops. (See Appendix Section D for a detailed description of
the index.) Geographic mobility is correlated with co-residency, so these variables are good
instruments for selection into the sample. Different weights are computed according to the
sub-sample. For example, the probit is run for males only when generating weights for the
father-son sub-sample.
It turns out, however, that the mobility results are fairly insensitive to weighting.
That is, the mobility results are largely unchanged, which indicates that co-residency bias
is likely insignificant. The selection model results for the total sample are reported in Ap-
pendix Table I. Females are less likely to be selected. This is the case because daughters are
more likely to move out of the home after marriage. Unsurprisingly, age and urban status
are negatively related to selection, as well as the three variables for geographic mobility.
Geographic mobility has a strong negative relationship to selection, with the effect of the
municipality’s immigration level being even larger than the effect of being a female.
The selection adjusted mobility results are reported in Appendix Table II. The results
for the father-son sub-sample are very similar to the baseline results. For instance, the
minimally controlled IGE is 0.612 after weighting and 0.620 before. The corresponding rank
slope increases somewhat more from 0.568 to 0.623, though the former estimate lies within
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the standard error of the latter. Co-residency bias apparently plays an insignificant role for
the father-son sample.
However, the selection adjusted results do diverge for the other sub-samples. Some of
the adjusted estimates become significant only at the 10% level while one estimate is turned
insignificant. The direction of change also varies, but the difference between these and the
baseline estimates should not be taken too seriously as the standard errors are very large
for the adjusted estimates in the small father-daughter sample. (The adjusted estimates for
the total sample diverge as well.) Many estimates for the rural and urban sub-samples are
similarly less significant after weighting, though the rural estimates generally show greater
mobility than the urban estimates.
D Variable Definitions
Annual labor earnings
The sum of individual earnings and the productivity-adjusted individual contribution to
household earnings. Bonuses and cash and non-cash non-labor income are excluded. Earn-
ings are inflated to 2014 price levels using provincial CPI. See Appendix Section A for a
detailed description for the construction of this variable.
Percentile rank
The position of individuals in the earnings distribution of a given year conditional on age.
I rank individuals using residuals from regressing annual labor earnings on a quartic of age
for each given survey wave.
Years of Schooling
The modal years of schooling reported by an individual after age 23. Educational attain-




A municipality is given a score on three dimensions: its most common type of road and its
proximity to train and bus stops. If the most common type of roads are dirt, zero points is
given. Stone, gravel, and mixed roads are given two points, and paved roads are given two
points. If a train or bus stops is in the community, two points are given. If they are within
one kilometer or greater than one kilometer away, the municipality is given one and zero
points, respectively. The sum of these points scaled to 10 (i.e., the product of the sum and
5/3).
Municipal immigration level
Percent of people in a municipality, aged 16-60, born in other provinces.
Municipal emigration level
Percent of people who report working out of town for over one month in the preceding year.
Province
The survey covers 12 provinces (Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan,
Jiangsu, Liaoning, Shaanxi, Shandong, Yunnan, and Zhejiang) and three direct-controlled
municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Chongqing). From 1989 to 1997, CHNS sampled eight
provinces. Heilongjiang replaced Liaoning in 1997, but Liaoning returned in the follow-
ing wave 2000. CHNS surveyed nine provinces until 2011, when Beijing, Shanghai, and
Chongqing were added that year. Zhejiang, Yunnan, and Shaanxi entered the survey in
2015.
Ethnicity
A dummy variable that equals one if the respondent is Han Chinese and zero if otherwise.
Urban area
A dummy variable that equals one if the respondent’s household is registered in an urban
area and zero otherwise.
Residence area
This variable takes on four values: one for city, two for suburb, three for town or county
capital city, and four for rural village.
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Job number
A dummy variable that equals one to indicate a primary job and two to indicate a secondary
job.

























∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent vari-
able is selection into the sample. Selection is defined as having
at least two non-missing earnings observations that span a min-
imum of nine years. Children not selected into the sample in-
clude those who are unlinked to fathers and those who are linked
but do not meet the sample requirements for earnings. Female,
Han Chinese, and urban are dummy variables that equal one
for the corresponding characteristic. Schooling is the individ-
ual’s median level of schooling after age 23. Municipal emigra-
tion is the percent of workers in a municipality who worked out
of town for more than a month. Municipal immigration is the
share of the population , age 16-60, born in another province.
The transportation index is based on a municipality’s roads and
proximity to train and bus stops (described in Appendix Sec-
tion D). Year and province dummies are all significant at the
1% level, but are omitted because of space constraints.
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Appendix Table II
Sample Selection Adjusted Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Sons Daughters Rural Urban
1. Log Average Earnings 0.590*** 0.612*** 0.773*** 0.100 1.108***
Age and Wave Controls (0.209) (0.074) (0.190) (0.152) (0.314)
2. Log Average Earnings 0.470* 0.505*** 0.486* -0.033 1.155***
Full Controls (0.263) (0.089) (0.253) (0.152) (0.342)
3. Average Rank 0.669*** 0.623*** 0.673*** 0.478*** 0.635***
Age and Wave Controls (0.073) (0.058) (0.099) (0.079) (0.126)
4. Average Rank 0.424*** 0.438*** 0.363*** 0.215* 0.591***
Full Controls (0.084) (0.060) (0.098) (0.114) (0.130)
5. Fixed Effects 0.644*** 0.488*** 0.750*** 0.295*** 0.704***
Age and Wave Controls (0.176) (0.051) (0.162) (0.096) (0.210)
6. Fixed Effects 0.589** 0.407*** 0.534** 0.175* 0.807***
Full Controls (0.236) (0.072) (0.234) (0.105) (0.264)
Observations 3,584 2,952 632 3,189 395
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The results reported in this table are estimated with in-
verse probability weights.
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